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abstract: The role of ecological constraints in promoting sociality
is currently much debated. Using a direct-fitness approach, we show
this role to depend on the kin-discrimination mechanisms underlying
social interactions. Altruism cannot evolve under spatially based dis-
crimination, unless ecological constraints prevent complete dispersal.
Increasing constraints enhances both the proportion of philopatric
(and thereby altruistic) individuals and the level of altruistic invest-
ments conceded in pairwise interactions. Familiarity-based discrim-
ination, by contrast, allows philopatry and altruism to evolve at
significant levels even in the absence of ecological constraints. In-
creasing constraints further enhances the proportion of philopatric
(and thereby altruistic) individuals but not the level of altruism con-
ceded. Ecological constraints are thus more likely to affect social
evolution in species in which restricted cognitive abilities, large group
size, and/or limited period of associative learning force investments
to be made on the basis of spatial cues.
Keywords: altruism, associative learning, game theory, kin competi-
tion, relatedness, spatially based discrimination.
The emergence of sociality is not a simple process. We
know since Hamilton (1964) that altruistic interactions,
in which an actor sacrifices some of its individual fitness
to the benefit of a recipient, must take place among kin
(altruism is here defined sensu stricto, thus excluding social
interactions, like “reciprocal altruism,” which increase the
actor’s individual fitness). A necessary first step is thus the
building of kin structures through the retention of grown
offspring within the parental immediate neighborhood
(Brown 1974; Gaston 1978; Emlen 1982). But we also
know that kin competition is a powerful force, strong
enough to drive complete dispersal if unopposed (Ham-
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ilton and May 1977; Frank 1986; Taylor 1988). It follows
that altruism cannot evolve unless a selective force opposes
kin competition, preventing it from driving complete dis-
persal, and thereby allowing kin structures to emerge. The
nature of this force remains a topic of vivid controversy:
“The origin of natal philopatry is the most fundamental
problem in cooperative breeding” (Stacey and Ligon 1991,
p. 833).
Two lines of thought have emerged, providing seemingly
opposite answers to this question (Koenig et al. 1992; Emlen
1994). The first one (e.g., Koenig and Pitelka 1981; Emlen
1982) puts a premium on the ecological constraints limiting
the likelihood that a dispersing individual will successfully
establish and reproduce in a new territory. These include
dispersal costs, habitat saturation, environmental harshness
or unpredictability, and any other factor that makes dispersal
unlikely to result in successful reproduction. By contrast,
the second line of thought (e.g., Zack 1990; Stacey and Ligon
1991; Komdeur 1992) puts a premium on the benefits that
potential dispersers may gain by staying home. These may
include inheritance of high-quality territory, group-size
effects, social interactions with kin, and any other factor
that makes philopatry more likely to result in a net fitness
gain (be it individual or inclusive).
The point has been made that these two lines should
not be seen as alternatives but as complementary hypoth-
eses (e.g., Koenig et al. 1992; Emlen 1994). Indeed, both
costs and benefits affect evolutionarily stable strategies, and
no one factor by itself causes restricted dispersal and co-
operative breeding in general. It remains true, however,
that a precise delineation of the relative importance of
intrinsic benefits versus extrinsic constraints in molding
species-specific patterns is of prime importance in a com-
prehensive study of social lifestyles. Extrinsic constraints
apparently play a crucial role under certain circumstances
(e.g., Jarvis et al. 1994; Spinks et al. 2000), while intrinsic
benefits seem to predominate in others (e.g., Zack and
Ligon 1985; Stacey and Ligon 1987, 1991). Investigating
which factors are likely to confer primacy to one set of
causes becomes, then, a central question in the study of
social systems. This article evaluates the possibility that
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the kin-discrimination mechanisms underlying social in-
teractions might be one of these factors.
Kin discrimination is actually as central to the evolution
of sociality as is philopatry. Hamilton (1964) initially sug-
gested that population viscosity might be a sufficient con-
dition for the emergence of altruism. If dispersal is low,
neighbors have a higher probability of being relatives than
do individuals randomly sampled from the whole popula-
tion. Thus, interactions among neighbors also occur among
relatives by the same token. However, numerical simulations
by Wilson et al. (1992) showed that population viscosity
might be unable to favor indiscriminate altruism (i.e., ran-
domly directed toward either resident or immigrant neigh-
bors), a result soon confirmed analytically by Taylor (1992).
The point is that as long as the habitat is locally saturated
neighbors are also more likely to be competitors (the prob-
lem obviously differs in unsaturated environments; Mittle-
dorf and Wilson 2000; Ferrie`re and Le Gaillard 2001). There
is no advantage for a focal individual to help neighbors
producing more offspring, if these offspring then compete
with its own for locally limiting breeding resources. It turns
out that the inclusive-fitness benefits gained from indis-
criminately helping neighbors exactly cancel out with in-
creased kin-competition costs. As pointed out by Queller
(1992, 1994), altruism cannot emerge unless social and eco-
nomic neighborhoods differ: partners must be more related
in altruistic than in competitive interactions.
Several kin-recognition mechanisms exist (Waldman
1987; Komdeur and Hatchwell 1999). Which ones are suf-
ficiently reliable to permit the evolution of cooperative
breeding in those species where kin selection is an im-
portant factor remains an open and crucial question
(Komdeur and Hatchwell 1999). Current evidence suggests
that familiarity-based recognition, gained through asso-
ciative learning, is the most likely mechanism enabling
helpers to discriminate kin from nonkin in avian societies
(Komdeur and Hatchwell 1999). Throughout the period
of association that precedes dispersal, the individual char-
acteristics of relatives (e.g., full sibs sharing the same nest
or burrow) are memorized and will be remembered after
the dispersal period has occurred. Thereby the focal in-
dividual will be able to individually recognize residents
from immigrants and behave accordingly. In that case,
altruistic interactions are highly likely to be directed to-
ward relatives only (and competitive interactions toward
nonrelatives), so that the inclusive benefits of sociality (the
“benefits of philopatry”) might well be strong enough to
counteract kin competition and refrain dispersal.
Queller (1992) suggested that a more rudimentary, spa-
tially based discrimination might succeed as well in fostering
altruism. As compared to familiarity, a spatially based dis-
crimination does not require sophisticated cognitive abili-
ties: any conspecific met within the natal patch, even after
dispersal has occurred, is accepted as a valuable recipient
of altruism (no need, therefore, to memorize individual
characteristics). It is also obviously much more error prone
since unrelated immigrants are as likely as related residents
to benefit from it. But, in principle, it may still allow some
altruism to evolve: since immigrants have no or few relatives
in their new habitat, residents necessarily have a higher-
than-average relatedness with their average patch mates (as
long as dispersal is not complete). Altruistic interactions
(expressed by residents only) are, therefore, statistically more
often directed toward relatives than are competitive inter-
actions (expressed by both residents and immigrants).
However, whether the social benefits induced by spatial
discrimination are high enough to counteract kin compe-
tition and prevent complete dispersal remains an open ques-
tion. Indeed, a spatially based altruism provides more ad-
vantages to immigrants than to residents since the former
benefits from it without having to pay its costs. This is
bound to bring strong incentives to dispersal, in such a way
that the benefits of social interactions may, paradoxically,
conjugate with kin competition to drive complete dispersal.
Such a process would obviously counterselect any form of
sociality.
In this article, we investigate the effects of dispersal costs
(meant here to represent any ecological constraint decreas-
ing the probability that a disperser reproduces successfully)
on the coevolution between altruism and dispersal, under
the two kin-recognition mechanisms delineated above. We
show that a spatially based discrimination does allow some
altruism to evolve but at a low level and only insofar as
dispersal costs prevent complete dispersal. Ecological con-
straints thus appear as a prerequisite for the emergence
of sociality, in strong contrast with what happens under
familiarity-based discrimination. Thereby, a formal link is
established between the kin-discrimination mechanism
underlying a social interaction and the question of whether
this interaction evolved through intrinsic benefits or ex-
trinsic constraints.
The Model
Since optimal strategies for social actions depend on how
partners (including relatives) behave, we follow a game-
theoretical, kin-selection approach. We use the direct-
fitness method elaborated by Frank and Taylor (Taylor and
Frank 1996; Frank 1997, 1998). A gene coding for an action
with some social consequences (be it altruism or dispersal)
affects the fitness of both actors and social partners. Al-
truistic interactions, for instance, as already mentioned,
bring costs to the actor and benefits to the recipient. The
fitness of a focal individual i expressing the gene in itsWij
neighborhood j is thus affected by both the direct effect
( ) of this gene on himself and the indirect effect ( ) ofz zij j
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Figure 1: Benefits (B) and costs (C) modeled as power functions of
altruistic investment (p). In all simulations presented here, the functions
and were used. A vertical dashed line is drawn where0.4 3Bp p Cp p
marginal costs and benefits equalize, that is, where curves have the same
slope (at for our parameter values).pp 0.455
identical-by-descent copies of this gene found with prob-
ability in related neighbors that interact with him. Hence,r
W p W(z , z ).ij ij j
The selective pressure on this gene must account for
both effects:
dW W dz W dzij j
p #  # , (1a)
dz z dz z dzij j
where is the breeding value (additive-genetic componentz
of the trait value) of the focal individual (assumed here to
be in control of its own actions). The expressions dz /dzij
and can be interpreted as the regression coefficientsdz /dzj
of the phenotypes of, respectively, the focal individual and
its social partner on the focal individual’s breeding value
(Taylor and Frank 1996). The evolutionarily stable strategy
(ESS) is found by setting the selective pressure to zero:
W W
 p r , (1b)
z zij j
where
dz dzj
rp # (1c)
dz dzij
is the kin-selection coefficient of relatedness between actor
and recipient (Frank 1998).
The similarity between equation (1b) and Hamilton’s
(1964) rule,
C ! rB, (2)
appears when we note that the left-hand sides of both
equations (1b) and (2) represent a cost to the actor, while
the right-hand sides represent the benefits to the recipient,
weighted by the coefficient of relatedness. Hamilton’s rule
often takes the form of an inequality as in equation (2)
because altruistic behaviors are often modeled as discrete
alternatives: fixed actions with predefined costs and ben-
efits are considered, and then the conditions under which
these actions can spread are derived. Here we assume,
instead, that costs and benefits are continuous functions
of some amount of investment in altruism, and then we
derive the equilibrium value of investment (hence the
equality in eq. [1b]). This, of course, implies that as-
sumptions are to be made on two functions rather than
two values. In order to converge toward inner equilibrium
values, we have to assume that marginal benefits exceed
marginal costs at low investment values, while the reverse
occurs at high investment values (as necessarily happens
if fitness is a saturating function of the resource ex-
changed). This can be modeled, for example, by two power
functions with different coefficients (fig. 1) in which costs
increase first slowly, then rapidly with investments, while
returns in benefits are first high and then diminish.
A second comment has to be made on the way we
formalize altruism. Wilson et al. (1992) and Taylor (1992)
assumed a “diffuse” altruism, in which altruistic actions
benefit the whole neighborhood, including the actor itself.
Corresponding biological situations may comprise the
building or defense of a common nest, or cooperative hunt-
ing of large prey. In our case, because we want to model
situations in which altruism is conditional to the status of
recipients (familiarity-based recognition), we have to as-
sume pairwise interactions. An individual engages in a pair-
wise relation with a suitable candidate, and this action brings
benefits B to the recipient and costs C to himself. In other
words, the actor gains no share of the benefit: its action is
purely altruistic. Corresponding biological situations may
include the share of a territory or any other breeding re-
source by its owner. Formally, we assume that every indi-
vidual gets a basic fecundity value mo, from which C must
be retrieved if this individual concedes an altruistic action,
and to which B must be added if this individual benefits
from such an altruistic action from a social partner (C and
B being functions of the amount of altruism, p). We show
in appendix A that this formalization does not change the
conclusions of Wilson et al. (1992) and Taylor (1992): the
inclusive benefits of indiscriminate altruism are exactly can-
celled out by the additional kin competition.
A few simplifying assumptions were also made for con-
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venience. We consider an infinite-island population model
with random dispersal, so that relatedness among patches
drops to 0 and immigrants find no relatives among their
new patch mates. Dispersal is followed by competition for
breeding spots, then by social interactions and reproduction.
We also assume nonoverlapping generations and asexual
reproduction, which facilitates the dynamic accounting of
relatedness.
Because altruistic interactions may be conditional to the
dispersal status of actors and recipients, the fecundity of
a locally born female may differ from that of an immigrant,
which affects the dynamics of relatedness. The equilibrium
value is given by (app. B)
2 2˜km  kml irp , (3)
2 2 2Nm  k m (N 1)p l
where N is the number of females breeding in the patch,
k the probability that a breeding female was born locally,
the probability that a breeding female was an˜kp 1 k
immigrant, the fecundity of a locally born female,m ml i
that of an immigrant female, and that of˜m p km  kmp l i
an average female. The main parameters used throughout
our model are otherwise defined in appendix C.
Analyses
Familiarity-Based Recognition
In the first situation investigated, social interactions take
place only among residents because associative learning
allows actors to individually recognize relatives from im-
migrants and only behave altruistically when encounter
occurs with a coresident. The fitness function is calculated
by noting the following two factors. First, the focal female
stays philopatric with probability , in which case she paysx˜ij
the cost with probability (probability to meet aC kp xij j
relative), and receives the benefit from a relative withBpj
the same probability. Competition for breeding spots oc-
curs among other females, where˜m x m xs m pp j p pj j
is the productivity of the parental gen-2m  k (B  C )o x p pj j
eration on the focal patch and that2m p m  k (B  C )p o x p p
on other patches. And second, in the case the focal female
disperses, she survives (or reaches reproductive status)
with probability s, competes with unrelated˜m (x xs)p
females for a breeding patch, and is not involved in any
social interaction. Her direct fitness is thus written
m  k (B  C ) mo x p p oj j ij
˜Wp x  x s . (4a)ij ij
˜ ˜m x m xs m (x xs)p j p pj
Note that residents are fitter than immigrants (as long
as ) since the latter do not benefit from altruisticB 1 C
interactions.
ES (Evolutionarily Stable) Altruism. The direct selective
pressure on altruistic investments is obtained by deriving
equation (4a) with respect to , and the indirect one, bypij
deriving it with respect to . Since selective pressures arepj
derived only as a way to find ESSs, we will formulate them
thereafter while assuming and ,p p p p p x p x p xij j ij j
which is always true at the equilibrium and considerably
simplifies notations. Hence,
2W k cx p
p  , (4b)
p mij p
2 4W k b  k (b  c )Jx p x p p
p , (4c)
p mj p
where is the marginal increase in costs withc p dC /dpp p
altruistic investments, is the marginal increaseb p dB /dpp p
in benefits, and 2Jp [m  k (B  C )]/[m  k (B o x p p o x pj j j
is the fecundity of a resident, relative to that ofC )] ≥ 1pj
an average female. The complete selective pressure is given
by , and the ESS is found by settingW/p  r(W/p )ij j
this pressure to 0. Hence,
2c p r[b  k (b  c )J]. (4d)p p x p p
The left-hand side represents the marginal costs of altru-
ism, and the right-hand side, its marginal benefits weighted
by the kin coefficient of relatedness between actor and re-
cipient. The net benefits consist of additional fecundity
( ) devaluated by the effects of additional kin competition.bp
The latter increases with the relative fecundity of residents
( ) as well as with philopatry (k). However, as relatednessJ
(r) also increases with philopatry (eq. [3]), the two effects
cancel out in such a way that the equilibrium altruism ap-
pears largely unaffected by dispersal (fig. 2A). Note also that
the selective pressure on altruism vanishes as k (and thereby
r; eq. [3]) tends to unity: condition (4d) is then met what-
ever the value of p, which means that altruism becomes a
neutral character in absence of dispersal.
ES Dispersal. The direct selective pressure on dispersal is
obtained as the partial derivative of equation (4a):
˜W sm  k (B  C )o x p p
p . (4e)
˜x m (x xs)ij p
This derivative contains two negative terms, showing that
emigrants lose both in terms of survival (mortality costs
of dispersal) and fecundity (they do not benefit from al-
truistic interactions). This combined effect brings strong
Dispersal, Altruism, and Kin Discrimination 475
Figure 2: ES philopatry (k) and altruism (p) patterns under associative learning. A, Altruism shows extremely low dependence on dispersal (solid
line), while philopatry increases markedly and monotonically with altruism (dashed line), reaching a maximum when the benefits of altruism are
also at a maximum ( ). Results displayed for and . B, Varying patch size induces a strong negative correlation betweenpp 0.455 Np 10 sp 0.9
altruism and philopatry, with maximal altruism and dispersal at low population sizes (due to strong kinship). Results displayed for . C,sp 0.9
Varying dispersal costs induce an increase in philopatry, while individual altruistic investments remain unaffected. Philopatry and altruism show
positive values even in the absence of costs ( ). Results displayed for .sp 1 Np 10
direct incentives to philopatry. The only force behind dis-
persal stems from the indirect selective pressure:
˜W k [m  k (B  C )] k k (B  C )x o x p p x x p p
p , (4f)
˜x m (x xs)j p
which shows one positive component: the first term in the
right-hand side corresponds to the value of the breeding
opportunity left behind, weighted by the probability that
this opportunity is seized by a relative (these are the ben-
efits of avoiding kin competition). There is, however, also
one negative component (second term in the right-hand
side), corresponding to the probability that this oppor-
tunity is taken by an immigrant. In this case, the relatives
of the disperser will lose one possibility to interact (and
with it the associated net benefit ). The completeB  Cp p
selective pressure vanishes when
s˜m  k (B  C )po x p p
˜rk [m  (k  k )(B  C )] (4g)x o x x p p
or, equivalently, when
˜s˜ rp r[k(1 r) kr], (4h)
where represents therp (m m )/m p [k (B  C )]/ml i i x p p o
relative fecundity advantage of residents over immigrants.
This result can also be interpreted in light of Hamilton’s
equation (dispersal as a means to avoid kin competition
can be considered an altruistic act). The left-hand side of
equation (4h) is the cost of the action to the actor (which
sacrifices some of its own survival probability and fe-
cundity by dispersing), while the right-hand side repre-
sents the benefits to recipients, weighted by the kin co-
efficient of relatedness between actor and recipient. Figure
2A shows that philopatry increases strongly and mono-
tonically with altruism, up to a maximum reached when
marginal costs and benefits equalize.
Figure 2 (fig. 2B, 2C) displays the joint equilibrium
under various N and s values. As this figure shows, positive
altruism and philopatry values are selected even in absence
of costs to dispersal. The benefits of altruism overweigh
the costs of kin competition and allow strong kin struc-
tures to emerge. Philopatry is a consequence of social in-
teractions not a prerequisite for them to evolve.
Spatially Based Discrimination
We now analyze the case where investment is triggered by
spatial cues, being expressed only when the focal individual
is resident but independently of the recipient’s dispersal
status. The cost is thus paid when the actor is residentCpij
(and whatever its partner) but not when the actor is an
immigrant into another patch. Reciprocally, the focal fe-
male will benefit with probability from the altruism ofkxj
related residents if she remains local and with probability
from the altruism of unrelated residents if she moves.kx
Hence,
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Figure 3: ES philopatry (k) and altruism (p) patterns under spatially based discrimination. A, Altruism increases sharply with philopatry (solid line),
while philopatry first increases, then decreases with altruism (dashed line). Results displayed for and . B, Varying patch size inducesNp 10 sp 0.9
a negative correlation between dispersal and altruism. The latter’s maximal value is only about half that found under associative learning. Results
displayed for . C, Varying dispersal costs increases both philopatry and altruism, which induces a positive correlation between these traits.sp 0.9
Both traits vanish in absence of mortality costs ( ). Results displayed for .sp 1 Np 10
m  C  k B m  k Bo p x p o x pij j j
˜Wp x  x s . (5a)ij ij
˜ ˜m x m xs m (x xs)p j p pj
The average productivity of the parental generation in
patch j is now , and that in averagem p m  k (B  C )p o x p pj j j
patches, because only a proportionm p m  k (B  C )p o x p p
of the breeding females are resident and thus displaykx
altruism. It is important to note that in such a situation the
fitness of an immigrant exceeds that of a resident: both
benefit from the altruism of residents around, but only
residents pay the costs. This is bound to have strong con-
sequences on both altruism and dispersal ES values.
ES Altruism. Deriving equation (5a) with respect to pij
provides
W c kp x
p , (5b)
p mij p
while deriving it with respect to givespj
2W k [b  k J(b  c )]x p x p p
p , (5c)
p mj p
where is the fe-Jp (m  kB C)/[m  k(B C)] ≤ 1o o
cundity of a resident relative to that of an average breeding
female.
The complete selective pressure on altruism (W/p ij
) vanishes whenr[W/p ]j
2c p r[k b  k (b  c )J]. (5d)p x p x p p
Relative to the case with perfect discrimination (eq. [4d]),
the benefits through increased fecundity are weighted by
a factor because only residents behave altruistically. Askx
a result, the optimal investment now depends strongly on
dispersal patterns (fig. 3A). While altruism can evolve to
some extent if philopatry is high, it progressively vanishes
as dispersal increases: altruistic investments are wasted if
they benefit only unrelated immigrants.
ES Dispersal. The direct selective pressure on dispersal is
given by
˜W C  s(m  k B )p o x p
p . (5e)
˜x m (x xs)ij p
As can be seen, the cost of altruism becomes there an
incentive for dispersal (because immigrants do not have
to pay it), while the second term in the right-hand side
numerator, stemming from the cost of dispersal, opposes
this incentive. The indirect pressure is obtained from
˜W k (m  k B  C ) k k Bx o x p p x x p
p . (5f)
˜x m (x xs)j p
This last expression also comprises one positive and one
negative term. The first one corresponds to the value of the
breeding opportunity left behind by an emigrant, weighted
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by the probability that this opportunity is seized by a rel-
ative. The negative term expresses the possibility that this
opportunity is taken by an immigrant, in which case rela-
tives will lose a benefit B (as immigrants invest nothing).
This situation thus contrasts with the preceding cases
in which direct selective pressures on dispersal were always
negative. Here, individual selection comprises a positive
component and kin selection a negative one: dispersal may
thus become a selfish action (avoiding to pay the costs of
altruism) while philopatry may become an altruistic act,
selected through its benefits on relatives. The complete
selective pressure vanishes when
˜s˜(m  k B ) C p rk [m  (k  k )B  C ]. (5g)o x p p x o x x p p
Optimal dispersal now depends nonmonotonically on
altruism (fig. 3A), first increasing, then decreasing with it.
This complex behavior results from the interplay of op-
posing forces evidenced above. As the burden of altruism
costs becomes too heavy, individual selection promotes
dispersal.
Figure 3 (fig. 3B, 3C) shows the joint equilibrium for
different N and s values. An important point is that as
dispersal costs vanish dispersal becomes complete (to
avoid both kin competition and the cost of altruism), and
this, in turn, makes altruism vanish. In other words, al-
truism needs dispersal costs in order to evolve. The emer-
gence of sociality is thus conditional to the previous es-
tablishment of philopatry through ecological constraints.
Discussion
Kin Discrimination and Ecological Constraints
Hamilton’s rule has the potential to initiate a positive feed-
back between philopatry and altruism. On the one hand,
philopatry creates kin structure, which should favor altru-
istic behavior. On the other hand, the expected benefits of
altruism among kin should favor philopatry. However, this
self-reinforcing loop may be blocked by kin competition,
which by suppressing all benefits arising from altruistic kin
interactions, prevents the evolution of social structures. This
is why the interplay between altruism and dispersal in any
species is modulated by its kin-discrimination abilities,
which play a major role in disentangling social and com-
petitive neighborhoods (Queller 1992, 1994).
The point must be made that the two kin-discrimination
mechanisms investigated here ultimately rely on spatial cues.
The only difference is that recognition is considered as “spa-
tially based” if spatial cues have to be used at the very
moment of providing altruism. By contrast, associative
learning allows organisms to build a mental association be-
tween spatial cues and the individual characteristics of
neighbors at a time when relatedness and proximity present
the maximal correlation. This association (or imprinting)
allows altruism to be subsequently allocated correctly, at
times at which correlation is normally much weaker. Thus,
the benefits of associative learning stem basically from a
temporal decoupling between spatial association and altru-
istic investment. This decoupling obviously makes big dif-
ferences if dispersal takes place in the meanwhile.
Differences are best seen when comparing figures 2A and
3A. Under associative learning (fig. 2A), altruism shows
extremely low dependence on dispersal, which contrasts
with the strong dependence observed under spatially based
discrimination (fig. 3A), in which altruism progressively
vanishes as dispersal increases. Mathematically, this is ex-
plained by the fact that philopatry (kx) weights the benefits
of altruism (rbp) in equation (5d) not in equation (4d).
More intuitively, this arises because, under spatially based
discrimination, altruistic investment is blind, being spent
mostly on unrelated immigrants when dispersal is high. By
contrast, associative learning allows altruism to be directed
only toward relatives, even when their relative density be-
comes vanishingly small.
Dispersal patterns also differ. Under associative learning
(fig. 2A), philopatry is high and increases monotonically
with the benefits of altruism ( ), while under spatiallyB  Cp p
based discrimination (fig. 3A), a complex behavior emerges:
philopatry first increases, then decreases with altruism. This
results from the selfish component of dispersal characteristic
of this situation: as immigrants benefit from the altruism
of residents without having to pay its costs, their fitness
exceeds that of residents, so that high altruism values select
for high dispersal. This situation differs qualitatively from
the previous one in which individual selection always selects
against dispersal. As a matter of fact, that philopatry may
exist at all under spatial discrimination may seem counter-
intuitive at first view since residents have a lower fecundity
than immigrants. The point is that the constraints on dis-
persal lower the fitness expectancy of emigrants. Philopatry
thus evolves only insofar as the fitness costs of dispersal
exceed the additional fecundity benefits of immigrants. The
frequency dependence of these benefits (the more immi-
grants, the less they benefit from the altruism of residents)
make an inner equilibrium possible.
As a result, dispersal costs constitute a prerequisite for
altruism to evolve under spatially based discrimination
(fig. 3C). In absence of dispersal costs ( ), all indi-sp 1
viduals disperse in order to avoid kin competition, so that
altruism cannot evolve. As costs increase, some individuals
stay home, from which social interactions may emerge as
the best of a bad job. It appears, thus, that the dynamic
accounting of dispersal and relatedness makes the con-
ditions for the evolution of altruism more complex than
previously thought. According to Queller (1992, 1994), a
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necessary condition for altruism to emerge is that partners
be more related in social than in economic interactions.
This condition seems sufficient as long as the dispersal
rate is fixed but not if dispersal is allowed to coevolve with
altruism (as in this approach). Our results indeed show
that under spatially based discrimination, a further con-
dition is required, namely, the existence of ecological con-
straints to dispersal. In the absence of such constraints,
social life disappears. This is precisely the outcome envis-
aged by the “ecological-constraint” model (Emlen 1982;
Jarvis et al. 1994; Spinks et al. 2000).
The situation differs drastically when associative learn-
ing allows perfect discrimination among potential recip-
ients. A strong philopatry and a high altruism level are
expected even in the absence of dispersal costs (fig. 2C).
Increasing these costs enhances philopatry, with no de-
tectable effect on altruism level. The benefits of altruism
largely outweigh the costs of additional kin competition
and thereby provide strong incentives for individuals to
stay home. Philopatry is thus enforced by sociality, which
is precisely the outcome envisaged by the “benefits-of-
philopatry” model (Stacey and Ligon 1991).
Empirical Avenues
Our approach thus points to a direct connection between
two fields of behavioral ecology considered up to now to
be relatively independent: on the one hand, the debate over
the role of extrinsic constraints versus intrinsic benefits in
the evolution of social interactions; on the other hand, the
study of the kin-discrimination mechanisms on which these
interactions rely. Because of this relative independence, em-
pirical data that might falsify or corroborate our model seem
pretty scarce. From the review of Komdeur and Hatchwell
(1999, p. 238) on birds, for instance, “there have been no
published experimental studies of kin recognition among
cooperative species, and little attention has been paid to the
actual cues used by helpers when making helping decisions.”
Below, we suggest a few predictions and avenues of research
that may help to test our model.
First, we expect the role of constraints to depend on the
cognitive ability and life-history characteristics of the species
under study. Associative learning requires higher cognitive
abilities from the actors (namely, the capacity first to as-
sociate spatial cues and individual characteristics and then
to memorize these associations up to the time when altru-
istic investments are to be made). The requirement of a
period of familiarization with relatives is more likely to be
satisfied in species with extended parental care. Further-
more, recognizing specific individuals may be relatively
straightforward in small families but presents greater cog-
nitive challenges in larger groups. Our analysis thus predicts
that ecological constraints are more likely to affect social
evolution in species in which restricted cognitive abilities,
large group size, and/or limited parental care impose kin
discrimination to rely on spatial cues, while the benefit-of-
philopatry model may prevail in those species (like many
birds; Komdeur and Hatchwell 1999) in which high cog-
nitive capacities, small family size, and extended parental
care may allow associative learning to perform a better kin
discrimination.
The fact that constraints have often been invoked in birds
as a main cause of sociality (e.g., Koenig and Pitelka 1981;
Marzluff and Balda 1990; Emlen 1991; Koenig et al. 1992;
Hatchwell and Komdeur 2000) may at first view seem to
oppose our prediction. However, the social parameter af-
fected by ecological constraints in birds is not the amount
of altruistic investment conceded by a philopatric individual
(as expected under spatially based discrimination) but the
probability that individuals will stay philopatric (and thus
help). This is precisely the pattern expected under associative
learning (fig. 2C): a proportion of individuals stay and help
even in absence of constraints (as documented by, e.g., Sta-
cey and Ligon 1991), and this proportion increases with
constraints (as documented by, e.g., Komdeur 1992). An
important distinction thus has to be made between indi-
vidual- versus population-level amount of helping since, as
we show, they may evolve independently. The former is a
measure of individual investment in an altruistic interaction,
and the latter, a measure of the proportion of individuals
that stay home and interact altruistically. Independent quan-
tification of both measures should provide insights into the
conditions prevailing in the evolution of the specific inter-
actions under study and should actually allow a test of our
model, provided the kin-recognition mechanisms under-
lying these interactions are also documented.
The importance of constraints has also been largely ad-
vocated in Bathyergidae (naked mole rats and relatives).
Social structures vary with ecological constraints and dis-
persal costs, both within and among species (Jarvis and
Bennett 1991; Jarvis et al. 1994; Spinks et al. 2000). There
is strong correlational evidence that both the number of
individuals remaining home and their individual level of
investment (social integration) increases with constraints
(Jarvis et al. 1994). From our study, this points to low kin-
recognition abilities, presumably not individually based, an
expectation consistent with the fact that eusocial Bathyer-
gidae live in large groups (up to 300 individuals in naked
mole rats) and (except for reproductives) are very short
lived (Jarvis et al. 1994). Existing data indeed suggest that
kin recognition in mole rats is not individually based but
relies instead on the specific odor of local colonies, rapidly
gained by immigrants if they succeed in entering a colony
(O’riain and Jarvis 1997).
Spatially based recognition may actually prevail even in
vertebrates with high cognitive abilities whenever invest-
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ments have to be provided at the moment of maximal cor-
relation between relatedness and proximity. Classical situ-
ations include mother-offspring interactions in mammals
and nest feeding in birds (Waldman 1987; Komdeur and
Hatchwell 1999). Parent birds feed whatever hatchling they
find in their nest, a situation largely exploited by parasites
(both conspecifics and allospecifics). In this respect, it is
relevant to note that the level of paternal investment by
cuckolded male birds often increases with their confidence
of paternity (Davies et al. 1992; Hartley et al. 1995) in a
way quite similar to what is expected from altruism under
spatially based discrimination (fig. 3A). Males have no other
cues than spatial ones to recognize their offspring, so their
level of investment should decrease as the number of “im-
migrants” (eggs fertilized through extra-pair copulations)
increases. We similarly expect that in the absence of con-
straints limiting the amount of extra-pair copulations, the
whole system (paternal investment) would collapse.
Associative learning may develop after birth throughout
the feeding period so that presumed offspring will be con-
sidered as such long after fledging or weaning times. This
observation points to the fact that, in contrast with the
assumptions of this model, associative learning does not
warrant perfect correlation between altruism and relat-
edness. Imperfect correlation at the time of association,
or imperfect memory at the time of allocation, are bound
to affect our predictions. We expect in such a case inter-
mediate outcomes, closer to the spatially based expecta-
tions if correlation at the time of association, or memory
at the time of allocation, is bad.
The strength of social structures has also been suggested
to correlate with environmental harshness, dispersal costs,
and habitat saturation in social insects (Ho¨lldobler and
Wilson 1977; Pamilo 1981; Pamilo and Rosengren 1984;
Keller 1995). Experimental manipulation of nesting op-
portunities has been shown to affect social structure in
hymenopteran species in which breeding opportunities
limit the fitness of dispersers. Polygyny in the ant Lepto-
thorax longispinosus drops as more nest sites are made
available (Herbers 1986). The number of helpers in the
stenogastrine wasp Liostenogaster flavolineata decreases as
more nests are provided (Field et al. 1998). Insects dis-
playing low and variable levels of sociality might indeed
constitute a good biological material to test our expecta-
tions, as discrimination mechanisms apparently show con-
siderable diversity among species (Crozier and Pamilo
1996). The best empirical evidence should come from ma-
nipulating constraints in species that rely on different
mechanisms and then monitoring both philopatry and
social integration. Species using a spatially based discrim-
ination (as might be the case in some polistine wasps;
Waldman 1987) are expected to display complete dispersal
in absence of constraints; increasing constraints should
enhance both philopatry and social integration (levels of
individual investments). By contrast, species using a
familiarity-based discrimination are expected to display
philopatry and sociality even in the absence of dispersal
costs; constraints should only enhance philopatry not the
level of individual investments. Interestingly, this seemed
to be the outcome of the experiments on stenogastrine
wasps mentioned above (Field et al. 1998): a significant
proportion of females remained as helpers even when the
immediate surroundings were experimentally saturated
with opportunities for independent breeding. This suggests
good kin-discrimination abilities, which is consistent with
the fact that small group sizes in this species (one to four
females) should enable individual recognition.
Model Limitations
How far do our results depend on the several assumptions
underlying the model? Those made about the shapes of the
functions delineating the costs and benefits of altruism were
quite specific (fig. 1), but we also used power functions with
different parameter values without any qualitative change
in the conclusions (N. Perrin and L. Lehmann, unpublished
data). We actually expect a similar behavior from any set
of functions in which marginal costs increase monotonically
while marginal benefits decrease monotonically.
Our infinite-island-model assumptions are unlikely to
affect qualitatively our conclusions either. In finite-island
models, immigrants still have zero relatedness (or nearly so)
with residents. If the island assumption is dropped (e.g.,
gene flow decreases with distance), then residents are some-
what related to immigrants (as long as the whole population
is taken as reference) but less so than to other residents, so
that predictions should not differ qualitatively.
The habitat-saturation assumption is certainly not al-
ways verified in practice (if only for demographic sto-
chasticity). Unsaturated environments are expected to
lower kin-competition pressures and, thereby, to increase
the overall philopatry and altruism levels. This should
also soften the contrasts among the kin-discrimination
mechanisms investigated here. A similar comment can
be made about the timing of events: if social interactions
are allowed to occur before dispersal and reproduction
(as might be the case, e.g., for insect larvae building a
common defense against predators) in such a way that
the benefits of sociality can be exported, then kin com-
petition will no longer counteract the emergence of al-
truistic behaviors.
Finally, the point must be made that many of the social
species mentioned above have overlapping generations
(this trait being actually part of the definition of euso-
ciality), while our model assumes discrete generations.
Overlap is likely to affect the dynamics of relatedness and,
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more importantly, to introduce asymmetries in pairwise
interactions, in terms of competitiveness, costs and ben-
efits of altruism, reproductive value, and access to infor-
mation (young females having no information about the
dispersing status of older partners). Furthermore, for-
malization efforts aimed at integrating the complexities
stemming from generational overlap are beyond the scope
of this article but might prove to be useful before the ideas
developed here can be properly and rigorously tested.
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APPENDIX A
The Case of Indiscriminate Altruism
Here we show that our specific formalization of altruism
(continuous settings, pairwise interactions, and coevolu-
tion with dispersal) does not change the conclusions of
Wilson et al. (1992) and Taylor (1992): the inclusive ben-
efits of indiscriminate altruism are exactly cancelled out
by the additional kin competition generated. Indeed, in
absence of discrimination, the focal female pays a cost
in every situation. If she disperses and succeeds inCpij
getting established, she will benefit from the unconditional
altruism of unrelated females ( ). If she decides to stayBp
as a resident, she will benefit from interactions with either
related or unrelated females, with probabilities that depend
on dispersal rate
˜m  C  k B  k Bo p x p x pij j j j
˜Wp xij
˜m x m xsp j pj
m  C  Bo p pij x s . (A1a)ij
˜m (x xs)p
The productivity from the focal patch is measured as
, and that of other patches,m p m  B  C m pp o p p pj j j
since all females from the parental genera-m  B  Co p p
tion interacted altruistically.
ES Altruism
The direct selective pressure on altruism is obtained as the
derivative of equation (A1a) with respect to :pij
W cp
p  , (A1b)
p mij p
while indirect pressure is obtained by
2W k cx p
p . (A1c)
p mj p
As can be seen, the benefits of altruism do not appear in
this equation because they are exactly cancelled out by the
increase in competition among kin. The complete selective
pressure is given by , which vanishesW/p  r(W/p )ij j
when
c p 0, (A1d)p
that is, when the costs of investments are at a minimum.
In our formalization, this corresponds to no investment
( ). Note that the complete selective pressure vanishespp 0
as before (i.e., altruism becomes a neutral character) when
.kp rp 1
ES Dispersal
The direct selective pressure on dispersal is
W s 1
p , (A2a)
˜x x xsij
while the indirect one is
W kxp . (A2b)
˜x x xsj
Thus the inclusive-fitness pressure on dispersal, given by
, vanishes whenW/x  r(W/x )ij j
s˜p rk . (A2c)x
This result, identical to Frank (1986), shows that dispersal
evolves here only through kin-competition avoidance and
independently of the level of altruism.
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APPENDIX B
Recurrence Equation for Relatedness
Two randomly chosen offspring have relatedness 1 if they
share the same mother and relatedness r if their mothers
differ but were both local (more precisely, they have, in
this case, relatedness 1 with probability r). The probability
that two randomly chosen offspring were born from one
given local mother is , and there are such2(m /Nm ) kNl p
mothers. Similarly, the probability that two randomly cho-
sen offspring were born from one given immigrant mother
is , and there are such mothers. Finally, the2 ˜(m /Nm ) kNi p
probability that two offspring were born from local but
distinct mothers is . Collecting these2 2k N(N 1)(m /Nm )l p
terms provides the recurrence equation
2 2 2 2˜km  km k (N 1)ml i l′r p  r, (B1)
2 2Nm Nmp p
from which the equilibrium value is derived by setting
:′r p r
2 2˜km  kml irp . (B2)
2 2Nm  (km ) (N 1)p l
Note that when the fitness of immigrant and resident fe-
males are equal, then equation (B2) reduces to the ex-
pression used by Taylor (1992) for asexually reproducing
organisms:
1
rp . (B3)
2N k (N 1)
APPENDIX C
Table C1: Parameter definitions
Parameter Definition
N Number of breeding females
xij Dispersal probability of female i born in patch j; xj is the average for patch j and x the average for the whole
metapopulation
s Probability (relative to that of a resident) that a disperser reaches a breeding status; it might represent, for
example, survival during dispersal; is thus the ecological constraint to dispersal (e.g., mortality cost)s˜
˜ ˜k p x /(x  xs)x j j Probability that a female randomly taken from patch j after dispersal is a resident; is thus the effective
˜kx
migration rate into patch j
pij Amount of investment by the focal individual in an altruistic act; pj is the average investment of females
born on the same patch as well as that of the parental generation, which also bears relatedness r to the
focal individual
Cpij Fecundity cost of altruism by the focal individual, an accelerating function of its investment pij
Bpj Fecundity benefit to the recipient of an altruistic act, a decelerating function of investment
mo Fecundity by default, in the absence of any interaction
mi Fecundity of an immigrant female; further specification will depend on how altruism is expressed
ml Fecundity of a locally born female; further specification will depend on how altruism is expressed
˜m p km  kmp l ij Average fecundity in patch j; the average for the whole metapopulation is mp
Note: The parameters under selection (altruism and dispersal) have subscripts ij if they refer to a phenotypic action under control of the focal individual
and j when referring to a phenotypic action controlled by social partners bearing relatedness r to the focal individual. Absence of a subscript refers to the
average value for the whole metapopulation. Tilde indicates complements to unity (e.g., ).x˜ p 1 xj j
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